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Abstract ISO 26262, titled Road Vehicles–Functional
Safety, is the new automotive functional safety standard for
passenger vehicle industry. In order to accomplish the goal
of designing and developing dependable automotive sys-
tems, ISO 26262 uses the concept of Automotive Safety
Integrity Levels (ASILs), the adaptation of Safety Integrity
Levels. ASILs are allocated to the components and sub-
systems that can cause system failure and malfunctions that
lead to hazards. ASILs allocation is a hard problem consists
of finding the optimal allocation of safety levels to the
system architecture which must guarantee that the highest
safety requirements are met while development cost of the
automotive system is kept minimum. There were many
successful attempts to solve this problem using different
techniques. However, it is worth pointing out that there is
an absence of a review that provides an in-depth study of
all the existing methods and highlights their merits and
demerits. This paper presents an overview of different
approaches that were used to solve ASILs allocation
problem. The review provides an overview of safety
requirements including the related standards followed by a
study of the resolution methods of the existing approaches.
The study of each approach provides a detailed explanation
of the used methodology and a discussion of its strength
and weaknesses including the main open challenges.
Keywords ISO 26262  Optimization  Exact solver 
ASIL allocation  Automotive system  Safety requirement 
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Introduction
Due to the rapid advancement of technologies, an
increasing number of electric and electronic devices are
used every day in people’s lives, in home, office and even
in public spaces. Some of these devices can represent a
danger or a threat to human health and environment by
causing harm. The latter is a physical injury or damage to
the health of persons [1]. Here is where the focus on safety
becomes a primary necessity. IEC 61508 [2] is an inter-
national standard for the functional safety of electrical,
electronic, and programmable safety-related systems (E/E/
PE). Safety-related systems are systems that perform a
function or a set of functions that ensure that risks are kept
at an acceptable level [3]. IEC 61508’s role is to minimize
the likelihood of failure of these systems by ensuring that
they provide the required safety integrity levels (SILs).
SILs are presented as five safety levels, which are used to
make sure that E/E/PE systems do meet the intended safety
requirements against the highest risks.
It is noticed in the last two decades that the number of
road accidents has increased significantly and as an out-
come, a massive number of casualties have occurred.
According to the global status report on road safety
released by the world health organization, over 1.2 million
people die each year on the world’s roads and between 20
and 50 million suffer non-fatal injuries [4]. Reliability of
automotive devices and systems is one of the major factors
that have a direct effect on the safety of road users;
Y. Gheraibia  S. Kabir (&)
School of Engineering and Computer Science, University of
Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK
e-mail: s.kabir@hull.ac.uk
K. Djafri  H. Krimou
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University
of Souk Ahras, 41000 Souk Ahras, Algeria
123
J Fail. Anal. and Preven.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11668-018-0466-9
therefore, standards like ISO 26262 have come to light.
ISO 26262 is an adaptation of the IEC 61508 standard for
the automotive industry. This new automotive functional
safety standard defines a safety life cycle applied to auto-
motive electronics, where designs must comply with the
standard by going through an overall safety process [5].
ISO 26262 uses the concept of Automotive Safety Integrity
Levels (ASILs) which are an adaptation of SILs in the
automotive industry.
ASILs are the key component of ISO 26262, used to
represent the severity of safety requirements. They are five
levels (QM, A, B, C, D) from the least strict ASIL (A) to
the strictest ASIL (D), where QM means no safety
requirements. Each level has a cost associated with it,
which refers to the used cost function. According to ISO
26262’s algebra, ASILs are assigned integer values as:
ASIL(QM) = 0, ASIL(A) = 1, ASIL(B) = 2, ASIL(C) = 3,
and ASIL(D) = 4. ASILs are allocated to hazardous com-
ponents based on the severity of the hazard caused by the
failure of that component. ASILs decomposition concept
allows the ASIL to be decomposed over components that
together provide the same hazard. ASILs allocation is a
hard, complex problem of finding the most appropriate
allocation of safety requirements to the components of the
automotive system. An appropriate ASILs allocation to
components and subsystems must guarantee the fulfillment
of least-risk safety requirement with the least development
cost.
Due to the criticality of the ASILs allocation problem
and its crucial importance in any automotive system’s
safety, an appropriate allocation must be found. To attain
this objective, exact solution techniques and optimization
methods are used. Although these two methods aim to
solve ASILs allocation problem, generally optimization
solvers converge faster by finding at least a near-optimal
solution; however, no guarantee is given that this solution
will be found. On the other hand, exact solvers may take
extra time, but they can find all exact optimal solutions.
In this review, after presenting an overview of the
background of safety requirements including safety stan-
dards, an in-depth study of the existing approaches for
ASILs allocation problem is presented. Here, different
approaches are categorized into exact and optimization
methods and described while identifying their strength and
weaknesses. Finally, future outlook for ASILs allocation
approaches is provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next
section, the background study of safety requirements is
introduced. In the third section, the ASILs allocation
problem is described. ‘‘ASILs Allocation Algorithms’’
section reviews both exact and optimization approaches
used for solving ASILs allocation problem. ‘‘Discussion
and Future Outlook’’ section presents a discussion and
summarizes the open challenges for the ASILs allocation
approaches. Finally, in ‘‘Conclusion’’ section, concluding
remarks are presented.
Safety Requirements: A Background Study
IEC 61508
IEC stands for the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission, which is an international organization for
standardization in the electrical and electronic fields and
publishing international standards in addition to other
activities. IEC 61508 is an international standard for the
functional safety of electrical, electronic, and pro-
grammable electronic (E/E/PE) equipment [2]. It sets out
the requirements to make sure that these systems provide a
functional safety, which is defined as the absence of
unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by the malfunc-
tioning behavior of E/E/EP systems.
ISO 26262
ISO 26262 is the new automotive functional safety stan-
dard for passenger vehicle industry [6], titled Road
Vehicles–Functional Safety applied to safety-related sys-
tems. It is considered as an adaptation of the IEC 61508 for
the automotive industry. It applies to the vehicles which
carry passengers or goods, with a number of wheels that
equal or greater than 4.
ISO 26262 standard is divided into ten parts [1]:
• Part 1—Vocabulary the terms, definitions, and
abbreviations.
• Part 2—Management of Functional Safety required
management of functional safety in automotive
industry.
• Part 3—Concept Phase the requirements for risk
analysis and risk assessment.
• Part 4—Product Development at the System Level the
requirements for product development at the system
level.
• Part 5—Product Development at the Hardware Level
the requirements for product development at the
hardware level.
• Part 6—Product Development at the Software Level
the requirements for product development at the
software level.
• Part 7—Production and Operation the requirements
for production, operation, and decommissioning
services.
• Part 8—Support Processes the requirements for sup-
port processes.
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• Part 9—Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL)-
Oriented and Safety-Oriented Analysis the require-
ments for ASIL-oriented analysis and defines the ASIL
decomposition concept.
• Part 10—Guideline on ISO 26262 overview of ISO
26262 and explanations of the other parts of the
standard.
ISO 26262 represents the safety-critical systems-specific
unifying standardization in the automotive industry to
provide systems that must comply with the standard by
going through an overall safety process. In order to develop
safety-compliant systems, ISO 26262 imposes a functional
safety cycle to verify the compliance of a product from its
conception to decommission. Decommissioning is the
phase to mark the end of the life cycle of a product. The
end of life cycle can be determined from the life expec-
tancy of the products that is built into their respective test
durability cycles.
Unlike IEC 61508 that measures the reliability of safety
functions and uses the maximum target probability, ISO
26262 is based on the violation of safety goals and provides
requirements to achieve an acceptable level of risk. It uses
the concept of ASILs, which are the key component for
ISO 26262 to classify the strictness of safety requirement
with respect to the software and systematic failure. ASILs
are fully dedicated to the safety of the driver and road users
and take no consideration of the system technologies.
In order to determine which ASIL to assign to a safety
goal, the product goes through a safety process according
to ISO 26262 to reduce the risk that can cause any harm
or threat to the driver or the road users. The process starts
by identifying hazards that could possibly be produced by
the malfunctions of the system. After identifying hazards,
the associated hazardous events are then identified. After
selecting the failure modes of the system, an ASIL will be
associated with the related safety requirement based on
the risk posed by that failure mode. The safety goal is
determined by a combination that gathers the probability
of exposure, the controllability by the driver, and the
severity of the failure. Once the risk is estimated,
according to the safety goal, an ASIL to be assigned is
determined.
Safety Integrity Levels
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) are used to classify the
strictness of safety requirement in safety-critical systems.
SILs were originally described in UK Health Safety
Executive guidelines [7]. They represent the levels of
safety assigned to a system or a subsystem in order to avoid
a systematic failure. SILs were adopted by many safety
standards, including IEC 61508 which defines five levels of
SILs from the least strict level SIL1 to the most strict SIL4
while SIL0 level means no special safety requirements.
SILs are assigned to system functions, subsequently to
their components in order to avoid the systematic failure
and the unacceptable risk according to a process defined in
several standards. This process performs the hazard esti-
mation and risk analysis, to eventually associate the
appropriate SIL that reduces the hazard with the desired
level. SILs play a dual role in the development and veri-
fication of systems [7] by allowing the top-down allocation
of safety requirements to subsystems and components
according to their criticality. It also allows the bottom-up
verification in order to ensure that the safety requirements
have been met. SILs are used to allocate safety require-
ments to hazardous components of critical systems to make
sure that their design is composed of safety-critical func-
tions that were assigned with an effective SIL without
necessarily forcing all components of those functions to be
associated with the maximum SIL.
SILs are defined as a manual and unaided process and
can be determined based on qualitative and quantitative
analysis. For example, Sallak et al. [8], Beugin et al. [9],
Zhang et al. [10], and Lee et al. [11] considered deter-
mining SILs either qualitatively or quantitatively. SILs
allocation process was first systematized and automated in
[7]. This allows finding the feasible optimal SILs alloca-
tions where the systems architectures are complex because
it delivers several safety-critical functions. This was
achieved using the fault tree analysis [12, 13] through HiP-
HOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and
Propagation Studies) [14–16]. HiP-HOPS is a state-of-the-
art model-based safety analysis (MBSA) [17–19] technique
compliant with the algebra defined by the functional safety
standard ISO 26262. The technique is supported by an
automated safety and reliability analysis tool that provides
an algorithm to automate the whole process in such com-
plex architectures, by doing so, it may be possible to find
the ASILs allocation in such systems.
ASILs Allocation Problem
Description
As previously mentioned, ASILs are classification levels
used to describe the stringency of safety requirements to be
met in a systems’ development life cycle, while taking in
consideration the systemic failure. ASILs are five levels:
QM, A, B, C, and D. Each ASIL is assigned an integer
value: ASIL(QM) = 0, ASIL(A) = 1, ASIL(B) = 2,
ASIL(C) = 3, and ASIL(D) = 4. ASIL (D) imposes the
highest safety requirement, ASIL (A) imposes the least
strict safely requirements, and ASIL (QM) implies no
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special safety requirement. Each ASIL has a heuristic cost
value defined within a scale which could be linear, loga-
rithmic, or exponential.
The failure of one or more components in the system
may cause a hazard. Severity, controllability, and exposure
of each hazard are used as a base, on which the hazard is
grouped into a given category. Each category is assigned
an ASIL. For each assigned ASIL, a safety goal is imposed.
The concept of cut sets is used when the combination of
failure modes of different components can lead to a hazard.
A cut set is a combination of events that can cause a system
failure. In such a case, the ASIL allocated to each of the
elements of a cut set should satisfy the ASIL allocated to
the cut set itself. Assigning the same ASIL as that of the cut
set to each element of a cut set would be prohibitively
expensive, which further lead to increase in the develop-
ment cost of the system considerably. In order to overcome
this obstacle and make sure that safety requirements are
met, the ASILs decomposition algebra proposed in ISO
26262 is taken into account. The algebra specifies that if
the failure of a set of components caused a given hazard,
then the ASIL assigned to the hazard is decomposed over
the set of components. As an example, consider a system
with Cn components. The failure of two components C1
and C2 caused a hazard of ASIL(D); then, this ASIL can be
decomposed over C1 and C2 as follows: ASIL(D) =
ASIL(B) ? ASIL(B), or ASIL(D) = ASIL(A) ? ASIL(C).
As formerly stated, ASILs decomposition and allocation
aim to ensure safety requirements fulfillment during the
development life cycle of the system on the one hand, and
reduce the development cost on the other hand. Thus,
finding an appropriate ASILs allocation and decomposition
is both critical and crucial tasks due to the huge size of
solutions search space. For example, NYTT60 is a steer-
by-wire system [20] having 8218 cut sets and 185 failure
modes, which results in a search space size of
2.04*10e219. Finding an optimal solution to the ASILs
allocation problem within such a huge search space is not
possible in a reasonable time. For this reason, ASILs
allocation gained its combinatorial nature and was classi-
fied as a hard problem.
ASILs Allocation Quality Measurement
ISO 26262 aims to produce and develop the most reliant
systems that provide the highest level of safety. Require-
ments are allocated iteratively to elements, components,
and subsystems. ASILs allocation falls under the influence
of the different requirements severities and cost develop-
ment. Therefore, for these reasons, ASIL allocation is not
just an optimization problem of simply assigning levels to
components. It is in fact a complex, critical, optimization
problem of finding the most appropriate ASILs allocation
that minimizes the cost while meeting the given safety
requirements. This allocation represents the optimal solu-
tion in the search space.
A feasible solution for ASILs allocation must fulfill the
safety requirements, meaning that it does not violate any
ASIL allocated to the safety goal of the corresponding
hazard. On the other hand, unfeasible solutions have at
least one failure mode that violates the given requirements.
The feasibility of each candidate solution is tested by using
the fault propagation information which is described as
minimal cut set (MCS) of the fault tree analysis (FTA).
MCS is extracted from fault trees and is defined as a
combination of system components’ failures that may lead
jointly to a hazard [21, 22]. The FTA identifies the func-
tions (components) over which an ASIL is decomposed and
allocated. These fault trees describe how the failure of a
system component can cause a hazard, which is assigned an
ASIL as well as a safety goal that is associated with it.
Allocated ASILs are implemented by independent com-
ponents where the failure of these components altogether
causes a safety goal violation. The top events in these fault
trees are the safety goals violations identified by the pre-
liminary hazard analysis.
A MCS may contain a single failure mode that can cause
the failure of the system directly or a combination of dif-
ferent failure modes that must fail together to cause the
failure of the functionality of the system. As it is defined in
the ISO 26262 algebra, the sum of ASILs allocated to each
event of a cut set is either equal or greater than the ASIL
allocated to the cut set. In order to determine the fitness of
each candidate solution, a cost function must be used, and
there is a group of cost heuristics which are presented in
Table 1.
The fitness of each candidate solution is simply calcu-
lated by summing up the cost of all ASILs assigned to the
failure modes. For example, if we have an automotive
system S containing five components {C1, C2, C3, C4, C5}
that might cause a hazard, a feasible candidate solution can
possibly be: {1, 3, 4, 2, 3} relating directly to {ASIL (A),
ASIL(C), ASIL(D), ASIL(B), ASIL (C)}. If we use a linear
cost function, the fitness of this particular solution would
be 130 because 10 ? 30 ? 40 ? 20 ? 30 = 130.
Since ASILs allocation is a hard and complex problem
with an enormous number of feasible solutions, it has been
Table 1 ASIL cost heuristics
Cost heuristics QM A B C D
Linear 0 10 20 30 40
Logarithmic 0 10 100 1000 10000
Experiential-I 0 10 20 40 50
Experiential-II 0 5 30 35 50
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at the core of interest of researchers. Over the years, several
techniques considering diverse methods have been devel-
oped to find an economic ASILs allocation. These
techniques are divided into two main categories: exact
techniques and optimization techniques.
ASILs Allocation Algorithms
Exact Approaches
Exact solvers aim to find the exact solution to a given
problem. There were some attempts to solve the ASILs
allocation problem using these solvers to find all exact
solutions. This section introduced the exact solvers that
were proposed and developed to solve ASILs allocation.
Exact Approach Using Three State-of-the-Art Solvers
Murashkin et el. [23] used three off-the-shelve solvers such
as CSP (Constraint Satisfaction Problem) [24], SMT (Sat-
isfiability Modulo Theories) [25], and ILP (Integer Linear
Programming) [26] to find the exact solution to the ASILs
allocation problem. More specifically, they used Choco
CSP [27], Z3 SMT [28], and CPLEX ILP [29] solvers.
Choco is a problem modeler for the constraint satis-
faction problem (CSP) and constraint programming (CP)
[30]. It is built and distributed under the BSD license
(Berkeley Software Distribution License). It is an efficient
and a readable constraint system for research, develop-
ment, and describing hard combinatorial problems in the
form of CSP and solving them. After modeling the problem
by defining the set of constraints that need to be met,
Choco solves it by using programming techniques. Z3 2.0.
SMT is an SAT (SATisfiability) standard of first-order
formulas with respect to other background theories such as
lists, arrays, bit vectors, and equality reasoning [25]. This
solver is a theorem prover developed by Microsoft
Research implemented in C??. Z3 integrates a modern
DPLL-based SAT solver, a core theory solver that handles
equalities and uninterpreted functions, satellite solvers, and
an E-matching abstract machine [31]. In the past, SMT
solvers have been successfully applied to the multi-objec-
tive optimization of software product lines [32, 33]. The
third exact solver is CPLEX ILP solver from IBM ILOG
CPLEX Optimization Studio 12.3, 64-bit edition [29].
Figure 1 shows the general workflow of finding exact
solutions to the ASILs allocation problem using each of
these solvers. As seen in the figure, the first step is to
encode the ASILs allocation problem for each of the sol-
vers so that the specification is compatible with the
reasoning mechanism of respective solver. This encoding
includes the representation of the key entities in the ASILs
allocation problem such as hazard, component failure
mode, minimal cut set, and readjustment of the cost func-
tions shown in Table 1 for the simplification of the solution
generation process. The detailed descriptions of how the
encoding was done for all the solvers are out of scope of
this paper. Interested readers are referred to [23].
Clafer 0.3.6 [34] was used to specify the ASILs allo-
cation problem for the Choco solver. Clafer is a lightweight
modeling language that aims at improving the under-
standing of the problem domain in the early stages of
software development determining the requirements with
fewer defects. Clafer’s optimization backend, based on
Choco CSP Solver 3.2 [27], was used to generate all the
optimal solutions. For Z3 SMT solver, the ASILs allocation
problem was directly encoded in a Python file that refer-
ences Python Z3 library. For CPLEX ILP solver, the
problem was encoded using a natural, algebraic linear
programming formulation, CPLEX LP file format (.lp
files).
The effectiveness and performance of this exact
approach using three different solvers were evaluated by
applying them on three variants of real-world Hybrid
Braking System Models (HBSMs) [35, 36]: HBSM 1,
HBSM 2, and HBSM 3. HBSM 1 has 31 MCSs and 24
failure modes; HBSM 2 has 94 MCSs and 60 failure
modes; and HBSM 3 has 11573 MCSs and 60 failure
modes. According to the workflow of Fig. 1, the encoding
of the ASILs allocation problem for each of the case study
and for each of the four cost functions was automated,
meaning that a total of 12 experimentation settings have
Fig. 1 Workflow for ASILs allocation using exact solvers
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been produced for each case study. Murashkin et el. [23]
performed all the experiments on an Ubuntu 12.04LTS 64-
bit machine with AMD Lisbon CPU 2.8 GHz processor
and 32 GB RAM. Based on their experiment, for HBSM 1
(smallest case study), all three solvers produced solutions
reasonably quickly. On the other hand, for the HBSM 2, the
Choco CSP did not perform well. More specifically, it was
not able to produce solutions in reasonable time for any
cost function except for the linear cost function. In the
contrary, Z3 SMT and CPLEX ILP solvers did actually
provide all optimal solutions for most instances in a quite
efficient time, but it was not clear which one outperformed
the other. However, for the HBSM 3, with the linear cost
function, Z3 SMT solver took 18.9 h while CPLEX ILP
took 13.3 days to complete.
System of Linear Equations
Dhouibi et al. [37] proposed a new approach to decompose
and allocate ASILs using a system of linear equations. This
latter is an ensemble or a collection of two or more linear
equations that has the same variables and has to be solved
all at once. A linear equation is defined as any equation that
has the standard form ax ¼ b, where a and b are real
numbers while x is the variable. It may have one or more
variables and is exponent free [38]. There are several
methods to solve a system of linear equations including
graphing method, substitution method, elimination method,
and Gaussian method [39]. The solution to a system of
linear equations implies assigning values to the variables in
a way that ensures that all equations are satisfied. In other
words, solving a system of linear equations means finding
the intersection points of the equations. It may admit one
solution, an infinite set of solutions, or zero solution
depending on the equations.
The proposed approach intends to interpret ASILs
decomposition and allocation problem as a system of linear
equations, where each equation is formed in the following
form.
X
ai  ASILFi ¼ ASILSR ðEq 1Þ
In the above equation, it is considered that ASIL allocated
to a function Fi (i.e., ASILFi) in the architecture refers to
the ASIL allocated to the safety requirement SR (i.e.,
ASILSR) provided by this function. The value of the
coefficient ai can be either 0 or 1, defining whether an MCS
contributes to the function loss. In other words, ai is 1 if the
reason of function loss is in the MCS and ai is 0 otherwise.
By applying this to all MCSs, a system of linear equa-
tions is created in the form of a matrix as seen below:
a11    a1n
..
. . .
. ..
.
1m1    amn
2
64
3
75
ASILF1
..
.
ASILFn
2
64
3
75 ¼
ASILSR1
..
.
ASILSRn
2
64
3
75 ðEq 2Þ
Different possible ASIL allocations can be obtained by
evolving this system of equations for ASILF1 to ASILFn. In
some cases, the safety engineer may have some safety
preferences to apply, such as assigning a specific ASIL to a
certain component or manipulating the dependency of
system components. To do so, new constraints can be
added to the system to incorporate these preferences by
modifying the corresponding equations. In order to assign a
certain component a specific ASIL, its corresponding col-
umn is removed from the system of equations. The non-
dependency of two variables is handled by using the logic
operator ‘‘OR’’ to blend their corresponding operator in the
system. As previously stated, there are numerous ways to
solve a system of linear equations. To do so, the augmented
matrix of the system is taken into consideration. An aug-
mented matrix of a system of linear equations is a matrix
where its elements represent the coefficients of the vari-
ables in the system [40]. Since the augmented matrix
resulting from the system is not always square, many of the
solution methods become inapplicable. In [37], Dhouibi
et al. used the Row Reduced Echelon Form (RREF) to find
solutions to the system of equations. RREF of a matrix is
generally obtained by Gauss-Jordan elimination where the
rows are the target of the elimination. After performing a
sequence of operations, the result will be a system in the
row echelon form, which is a matrix with all zero rows
being at the bottom of the matrix [41]. The first number of
the nonzero row is in a column to the right of the first
number of the row above it, and all leading entries in the
row below are zeros. This helps to identify the pivot and
free variables that correspond to the columns with no
leading entry. After this, to find solution(s) to the ASILs
allocation problem, these variables are assigned with val-
ues within ASILs numerical values range {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
The values of the rest of the variables are then obtained
using back-substitution. The echelon form of the system of
equations reveals whether the system may admit a possible
ASILs allocation or not. Solvability is determined from the
system of equations; if it contains an equation in the form
of 0 = Cst [37], then the system is not solvable. In such
cases, the safety engineer can either review the system or
just ignore the preferences he made earlier. The approach
proposed by Dhouibi et al. [37] was used in [42] to assist
with the system design and architecture optimization by
considering safety and cost as constraints.
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Optimization Approaches
Exact solvers can produce an exact solution to a given
problem, but they may take too long to find a solution. In
order to improve the performance of the exact solvers in
terms of execution time, optimization approaches are pro-
posed. Optimization solvers are algorithms which produce
a near-optimal solution, it may not be the best, but it rep-
resents a feasible solution generated within a small amount
of time. The following sections present a set of optimiza-
tion algorithms used to solve ASILs allocation problem.
Integer Linear Programming Approach
The approach presented in [43] proposes a method that
allows an automatic allocation of ASILs to the system
components by considering the ASILs allocation problem
as an integer linear programming problem. First of all, an
integer linear programming optimization problem is the
type of problems that aims to either maximize or minimize
an objective function that is subject to given constraints.
All (or some) variables are tied up to integer values, and
both objective function and constraints are within a linear
scale [44]. The solution to this problem grants an optimal
ASILs allocation by optimizing an objective function that
takes into consideration a set of constraints. Constraints
used in the proposed approach are identified in the pre-
liminary hazard analysis, extracted from fault tree analysis
results, and defined by the safety engineer as safety
preferences.
This approach uses a modeling framework to create an
EAST-ADL (Electronic Architecture and Software Tech-
nology-Architecture Description language) [45] model,
which is a UML-based domain-specific language. EAST-
ADL is applied in the automotive software-based systems
domain. It aims to build a model to illustrate the automo-
tive electronic system using meta-models and natural
language [46]. This model is used to describe the system
components, the relations connecting them as well as their
reliance, which subsequently leads to model their failures.
Moreover, it allows modeling safety goals and assigning
ASILs to system components. The automatic generation of
fault trees from the EAST-ADL model is supported by the
previously mentioned framework. MCSs of the fault trees
are then used later as inputs by the framework’s solver
dedicated to solve the ILP problems.
A constraints solver designed to solve ILP problems is
provided by the framework to find an optimal ASILs
allocation. The idea is to extract MCSs from fault tree
analysis results, preliminary hazard analysis results and
take into consideration the engineer’s preferences. This
combination was used to build constraints that represent an
input to the solver. The solver considers two main types of
constraints on each system component’s ASIL. The first
constraint is related to the minimal cut sets. For each
minimal cut set j(j = 1…n) where j comprises of
fi i ¼ 1. . .mð Þ, a failure of a system component Ck that may
cause a safety goal violation, a constraint is defined. Each
constraint has a coefficient Cxy for each component, which
is set to 1 if fi belongs to the MCSj, otherwise its value is
set to 0. In case where the conjunction of components
failure may lead to a safety goal violation, their coefficients
are set to 1 and the rest of the coefficients are set to 0 in the
constraint. Finally, if a single component causes a safety
goal violation, its coefficient is set to 1, while the rest of the
coefficients in the corresponding constraint are set to 0.
The second type of constraint is related to the safety
engineer’s preferences. These preferences aim to reduce
the cost of the allocated ASILs. From this perspective, a
preferred ASIL is set to selected system components. For
each component Ck; if a preferred ASIL is defined to Ck, a
coefficient is defined and set to 1.
The constraint solver is then used to solve the ILP
problem to find the optimal allocation of ASILs to system
components. In this approach, the authors created a plug-in
for an open-source tool called Papyrus [47]. This plug-in
embeds a constraint solver with the Papyrus tool to support
the fault tree generation and automatic ASILs allocation.
Once the solver is executed, if a solution is found, it is
reported to the user. The solution is then examined by the
engineer who will choose the action to be taken according
to the quality of the solution. If it is adequate, the ASILs
allocation to the system components is initiated and the
EAST-ADL model is automatically changed in accordance
with the new solution, else, the safety engineer will have to
make some changes to his/her preferences and rerun the
solver.
Penalty-Based Genetic Algorithm
Originally developed by John Holland in 1975, genetic
algorithm (GA) is a search metaheuristic that mimics the
process of natural evolution. It uses the concepts of natural
selection and genetic inheritance [48]. The genetic algo-
rithm is applied to unconstrained combinatorial
optimization problems; therefore, the need for a method to
get a handle of the constraints has appeared. There are
several methods that can be used with GA to ensure the
non-violation of the constraints.
In [5], Parker et al. used a penalty-based genetic algo-
rithm [49] to solve ASILs allocation problem. The
flowchart of the approach is shown in Fig. 2. This approach
uses a fixed-length encoding where each ‘‘case’’ can hold a
value from 0 to 4 (QM to D, respectively). The fitness
function defined in this approach is equal to the sum of the
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ASILs costs of each candidate solution. Different scaling is
used to define the cost of each ASIL, as seen in Table 1.
In the first step, initial solutions for ASILs allocation
problem are generated randomly. In the second step,
genetic operators are applied to create new candidate
solutions by manipulating the existing ones which were
selected in the previous phase. Genetic operators are:
recombination and mutation. In the selection process, the
algorithm selects solutions from the population to perform
genetic operations. The idea is to apply ‘‘the survival of the
fittest’’ principle. First of all, candidate solutions are clas-
sified according to their penalized fitness. Selection is done
based on how close the candidate is to a randomly chosen
number between 1 and the square root of population size.
Mutation stochastically disorders the population by
changing the value of each ‘‘case’’ of the selected candidate
solution to a random number between 0 and 4 (ASIL
levels) according to an antecedently specified mutation
probability. Recombination creates new candidate solu-
tions by imitating biological reproduction. The
recombination operator used in [5] is the uniform cross-
over, which consists of creating offspring by randomly
selecting an encoding ‘‘case’’ from one of the parents
encoding.
Fig. 2 Flowchart of penalty-
based GA for ASILs allocation
problem
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In the next step, the newly generated solutions are added
to the existing population. Each of the solutions within this
population is then ranked by their fitness. During the
ranking process, candidate solutions with lower fitness
value are favored, unless they are considered as infeasible
solutions. The penalty method used in [5] is applied to
increase the penalty on infeasible candidate solutions, i.e.,
reduces the fitness of candidate solutions that violate the
constraints as the search progresses. A set of minimal cut
sets (MCSs) of the fault tree analysis using HIP-HOPS is
used to check for candidate solutions feasibility. The fea-
sibility of a solution is checked by comparing the total
value of the ASILs allocated to different MCSs with the
ASIL required for the hazard caused by these MCSs. The
violation of a requirement is represented by an ‘‘in-
valid_ASILs’’ counter that increases when sum of ASILs
assigned to different failure modes differs from the one
required to be met by the MCS containing these failure
modes. The ‘‘invalid_ASILs’’ counter values are measured
and added as a penalty to the ASIL cost of the candidate
solutions. A feasible solution will have an ‘‘invalid_ASIL’’
equal to zero and thus will receive no penalty. On the other
hand, an infeasible solution will have a nonzero count for
‘‘invalid_ASILs,’’ and the magnitude of the value will
depend on the number of safety requirements violated by
that particular solution. The higher the value of ‘‘in-
valid_ASILs,’’ the greater the penalty received by the
infeasible solution. In this way, if two solutions have equal
cost, the solution with higher penalty will deem as less fit
solution. However, a dynamic threshold is defined to allow
near-feasible solution a certain degree of constraint viola-
tions in the early search generations. As the search
progresses, the generated solutions are designed to face
harsher penalties by varying the threshold value. When all
the solutions are ranked by their fitness, the less fit solu-
tions are removed from the bottom, unless the population
size reaches the initial size. The whole process continues
until the stopping criteria are reached.
The effectiveness of this approach has been evaluated by
applying it to three different versions of the hybrid braking
systems mentioned in ‘‘Exact Approach Using Three State-
of-the-Art Solvers’’ section. The computational perfor-
mance was evaluated on a machine with Intel core i5
3.40 GHz processor with 8 GB RAM. For different cost
functions, the average run time to find solutions for each of
the systems is shown in Table 2.
Tabu Search Algorithm
Developed by Fred Glover in 1986, Tabu search (TS) is an
optimization metaheuristic that uses local search methods
to solve combinatorial problems [50]. TS starts from a
feasible solution and creates a neighborhood of the current
solution. Neighborhood solutions are evaluated, and only
one candidate solution is chosen on the basis of its fitness
to replace the current solution until a local optimum is
reached. In this case, a worse neighbor can be selected to
replace the current solution even if it does not improve the
current one. Tabu search has a so-called Tabu list, which
represents a short-term memory to store previously visited
solutions; the list is updated whenever a new solution is
found. This way search would not return to recent moves.
The search stops when a termination criterion is met.
Tabu search was used in [6] for automatic decomposi-
tion of safety integrity levels based on the work presented
in [51] by employing the Steepest Descent Mildest Ascent
(SDMA) method. The original version of the method fol-
lows Steepest Ascent Mildest Decent (SAMD) [52], i.e.,
the steepest ascent until a local maximum is reached and
then it uses the mildest descent to escape from it. Since the
original method is meant for maximization problems,
SDMA is developed as an adaptation to the SAMD to
minimize ASILs cost.
The algorithm starts with a number of iterations p from a
feasible solution. Using the steepest descent decrement, the
ASIL of the failure mode that results in the highest
decrease of the cost of the system decremented iteratively.
This process continues until it leads to the ASIL decom-
position rules violation. This situation implies that a
minimum has been reached and the algorithm uses the
mildest ascent to avoid being trapped in the local minima.
A variable fi is set to be equal to p and decrements when
every iteration is complete. fi prohibits the search from
deceasing the ASIL of a failure mode i after an ascent
move is performed. Another variable f
0
i is set to prohibit the
increase of ASIL of failure mode i after a descent move is
performed. The prohibition is limited within a number of
iterations p
0
, but unlike p, p
0
does not decrement after every
iteration, and it only decrements in case where an addi-
tional ASIL decrease has been done in a specific iteration.
It is worth pointing out that the value of p differs from p
0
and both of their values dynamically change as the search
evolves. The value of p is altered with a single increment
after three iterations are done while the value of p
0
is
altered with a single increment after four iterations are
done. Both of their counts are reset when each reaches its
Table 2 Average run time in seconds to find optimal solution using
penalty-based GA approach
Cost heuristics HBSM 1 HBSM 2 HBSM 3
Linear 1.04 4.67 15.51
Experiential-I 1.21 7.32 14.63
Experiential-II 1.07 2.47 3.31
Logarithmic 1.98 2.35 3.04
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limits. In order to find a better solution, the approach
presented in [6] declines move restriction to ensure better
diversification of the search. The search ends if a number
of repetitions are achieved without improving the solution.
In terms of time required to find an optimal ASILs
allocation, Tabu search-based approach made improve-
ments over the penalty-based GA approach. Table 3 shows
the average run time of the Tabu search-based approach to
finding optimal ASILs allocation for the three variants of
the hybrid braking system.
Penguin Search Optimization Algorithm
Proposed by Gheraibia and Moussaoui [53], Penguin
Search Optimization Algorithm (PeSOA) is a new algo-
rithm in the nature-inspired meta-heuristics. PeSOA
imitates flightless birds hunting mechanisms by guiding the
search strategies using several rules. Those rules resume
the foraging behavior of penguins. A summary of the rules
is presented as follows.
The optimization process starts by generating a popu-
lation P of penguins. The population is then divided into
several groups, where each group contains n number of
penguins. The value of n varies depending on the food
availability in a specific area, more food implies more
penguins. Regarding their oxygen reserve, penguins
stochastically explore the sea searching for food. They dive
to different levels and each group hunts in a particular
depth depending on the energy gain. Communication
among sea birds is presented in two forms: intra-group and
inter-group. As the oxygen reserve depletes penguins sur-
face up and share information about food location and
quantity with the rest of the group. This is the intra-group
communication. The food available in certain areas may
not be sufficient to feed the whole group; in such case,
some members of the group or the whole group moves to
another group through inter-group communication.
The PeSOA was used by Gheraibia et al. [54] to find an
optimal ASILs allocation. The algorithm uses the concept
of equivalent classes to prioritize a set of failure modes.
Equivalent classes are the class of failure modes that pro-
duce the same integrity, but may have different costs.
Elements of lower cost are assigned a higher priority while
elements of higher costs are assigned a lower priority. The
classes are then constructed by building all possible com-
binations of each ASIL (from ASIL 1 to ASIL 4). Next, the
cost heuristic function is used to calculate the cost of each
combination, followed by priority generation which con-
sists of sorting the cost of elements of the classes
ascendingly. After that, as previously mentioned, grant
low-cost elements a high priority and high-cost elements
low priority. Priorities guide the penguins search while
improving the current solution by replacing the low-pri-
ority ASILs with others with higher priority. This strategy
may violate the system safety requirements and lead to turn
the current solution into infeasible one, but the algorithm
got a handle of the situation by incrementing the ASIL 0
components to ensure solution feasibility.
Since priority classes help to reduce the solution space
by considering equivalent classes, it leads to a better esti-
mation of the population size. A population of P penguins
that comprehends a set of feasible solutions is generated
and divided into several groups; this technique guarantees
that the search would not be trapped in the local optima.
Population partitioning is done on the basis of how fre-
quently a failure mode appears in the minimal cut sets. To
do so, minimal cut sets of the system are parsed. After that,
failure mode frequencies are calculated and ordered in a
way that ensures a good distribution of the population by
assigning each group of penguins a set of failure mode
ASILs to handle during the search progress. This will
further lead to an optimal ASILs allocation. Each penguin
generates a neighborhood of solutions and chooses the best
one among them subject to the fitness function, i.e., if the
fitness of the new solution is higher than the current one.
The penguin is allowed to move to another position in the
upcoming iteration, and the oxygen reserve is updated
which grants the penguin further extendibility of the
search. The size of the neighborhood is related to the
oxygen reserve, which differs from a penguin to another.
Higher oxygen reserve implies larger neighborhood of
solutions. Contrariwise, if the solution is not improved,
then the oxygen reserve decrements; consequently, the
solutions neighborhood size is reset to 1. Penguin’s popu-
lation is redistributed according to the improvement each
penguin has achieved. The improvement is represented by
the difference between the cost of the current solution and
the new one. The termination criterion is reached when the
total cost stops decreasing.
By using the concept of equivalent class and multi-
group communication, the PeSOA-based approach finds
solutions quickly compared to the GA and the Tabu search-
based approaches. PeSOA-based approach was applied to
the three variants of hybrid braking systems, and the results
presented in Table 4 show the improvements over other
approaches.
Table 3 Average run time in seconds to find optimal solution using
Tabu search-based approach
Cost heuristics HBSM 1 HBSM 2 HBSM 3
Linear 0.05 3.65 4.44
Experiential-I 0.74 4.20 14.70
Experiential-II 0.84 0.79 5.72
Logarithmic 0.31 1.82 1.91
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Ant Colony Algorithm
Recently, a methodology has been proposed by Gheraibia
et al. [55] for ASILs allocation problem. This method
extends the work presented in [56] and uses the Ant Colony
Optimization (ACO) [57, 58] to allocate safety require-
ments. The ant colony algorithm is a well-known swarm
intelligence algorithm. It imitates the collaborative
behavior of an ant colony. In ACO, each ant acts separately
by investigating the area and after each tour, each ant
updates pheromone to inform its affiliates for the quality of
its previous tour.
ACO has been used to solve the ASILs allocation
problem by incorporating a couple of strategies to reduce
the research space before starting the optimization process.
These strategies are based on both internal and external
information on the cut sets and the cost functions. The first
strategy is based on the cost function values. After ana-
lyzing the different combination of failure modes ASILs, it
was found that according to the cost function, it is possible
to discard some combinations, and by doing so, the search
space is reduced considerably. The second search space
reduction strategy is based on the cut sets. This approach
aimed to reduce the search space by reducing the number
of possible ASILs for each failure mode (i.e., reduce the
range of each failure mode ASIL from five possibilities to
lower value).
The ant colony algorithm uses these strategies to achieve
the optimal ASILs allocation at a reasonable time. The
ASILs allocation problem has been formulated as a graph
where the nodes represent the failure modes and the edges
represent the ASIL allocated to the destination node of
these edges. This new representation of the ASILs alloca-
tion problem helps the ants to explore the search space
efficiently. Each ant explores the graph, and at the end, it
updates the pheromone value to communicate to other ants
the quality of the explored path. In this way, ants can make
informed decisions while exploring the search space, which
in turn results into improved solution. Ant colony algo-
rithm for ASILs allocation has been evaluated using two
different case studies: the hybrid braking system and the
steer-by-wire system. Table 5 shows the results for the
three variants of the HBSM. As seen from this table, in
terms of execution time, the ACO-based approach out-
performed all the existing approaches.
Discussion and Future Outlook
ASILs allocation is one of the important tasks that is
needed to be performed in the automotive industry to
comply with ISO26262 standard in order to satisfy the
safety requirements of the system being developed while
reducing the development cost. Due to the nature of the
problem and the ASILs decomposition rules defined in the
ISO26262 standard, the ASILs allocation problem is cate-
gorized to have a combinatorial nature. Over the years,
researchers have devoted their efforts to find an efficient
solution to the ASILs allocation problem. As an outcome,
various techniques have been developed to solve this
problem and these techniques tend to gravitate toward two
different paradigms—exact and optimization approaches.
The approaches used for ASILs allocation have their
own advantages and disadvantages. In general, if there
exists a solution to a particular ASILs allocation problem,
the exact approaches guarantee to find the solution.
Although these approaches guarantee to find a solution,
they may take an exceptionally long time to find it. For this
reason, these approaches can be used for ASILs allocation
of smaller systems, but if the system is complex and large,
application of the exact approaches will not be feasible.
Introduction of optimization approaches has improved the
execution performance of the ASILs allocation process
greatly. Unlike the exact approaches, the optimization
approaches cannot guarantee an optimal solution, but they
can provide the near-optimal solutions within a reasonable
period of time. In many cases, these near-optimal solutions
are sufficient and can guide to an improved design of
critical systems by satisfying critical safety requirements.
More importantly, the optimization approaches can be
applied to ASILs allocation of large-scale systems, which
is not possible using exact approaches.
Although, in terms of execution time, optimization
approaches generally perform better than exact approaches,
these approaches have their own issues. For example, the
Table 5 Average run time in seconds to find solution using ACO-
based approach
Cost heuristics HBSM 1 HBSM 2 HBSM 3
Linear 0.003 0.01 0.16
Experiential-I 0.007 0.02 0.35
Experiential-II 0.009 0.03 0.62
Logarithmic 0.008 0.02 0.20
Table 4 Average run time in seconds to find optimal solution using
PeSOA-based approach
Cost heuristics HBSM 1 HBSM 2 HBSM 3
Linear 0.08 0.11 0.27
Experiential-I 0.09 0.38 0.59
Experiential-II 0.10 0.41 0.89
Logarithmic 0.12 0.21 0.32
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integer linear programming approach is flexible and sim-
ple, and it can solve complex problems. The issue with this
approach is that the problem in hand must be linear in
nature, but in the real world, problems rarely have a linear
nature. Moreover, the ILP approach concentrates on either
maximizing or minimizing an objective function, meaning
it is not suitable for multi-objective optimization problems,
but most real-world problems in dynamic environments
have multiple objectives to optimize.
From the review, it is noticed that improvement (in terms
of execution time) has been made within the optimization
approaches by following different strategies. For example,
the PeSOA approach has made improvement over GA and
Tabu search-based approaches by reducing the search space
by using the concept of equivalent classes and also by
applying the concept of multi-group communication.
However, the multi-group communication can lead to longer
execution time if there exists only one solution to a given
problem. On the other hand, the ant colony-based approach
made improvement over all other approaches by cutting the
search space by adopting two strategies and by formulating
the ASILs allocation problem as a graph-search problem,
which makes it the superior approach so far.
Although the approaches found in the literature help to
automate the ASILs allocation problem, there exist many
challenges in this area. From the review, it is seen that the
exact approaches guarantee a solution for smaller systems.
However, they do not scale for larger systems. Future
research may attempt to improve the performance of the
exact solvers by developing a more efficient encoding
mechanism or by utilizing the increased computing power
available in modern machines. As suggested in [23], one
possible option may be the use of parallelization to expe-
dite the search process. This is also applicable to the
optimization approaches.
At present, all the approaches find solution to the ASILs
allocation problem based on qualitative analysis of fault
trees, i.e., based on the minimal cut sets. The failure rates/
probabilities of the basic events of the fault trees are not
utilized in the ASILs allocation process. In the future, it is
worthwhile performing research to develop higher level
functionalities by taking extra parameters into account,
such as the quantitative data (e.g., failure rates) related to
the basic events of the minimal cut sets. At the same time,
some of the existing approaches allow a system analyst to
incorporate their preferences in the ASILs allocation pro-
cess. Future trend of ASILs allocation problem may see the
inclusion of other stakeholders’ preferences in the alloca-
tion process. For instance, new techniques may be
developed to allow the designers to add their preferences so
that the designers’ choices would be taken into consider-
ation when identifying good solutions. Moreover, designers
may be given more control on the ASILs allocation to
components of the system by using a mix of cost heuristics
and/or to take into account the cost information related to
certain categories of components. In terms of experimental
studies to verify the performance of the approaches, cur-
rently the approaches are mostly evaluated by applying
them to different version of hybrid braking systems. In the
future, we may expect to see the use of different case
studies and problem formulation methods to test each
approach in order to achieve better performance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an overview of various concepts
related to the automotive safety integrity levels allocation
and decomposition problem. We introduced ASILs allo-
cation as a real-world problem having a combinatorial
nature that is directly related to peoples’ lives. The lack of
such a review of the literature that gives an overview of the
problem was the main motivation to review the concepts
and the approaches used to allocate ASILs. The review
introduced the origins of the problem and covered a
background study of the fundamental concepts related to
the ASILs allocation problem. We briefly presented the
IEC 61508 and ISO26262 standards; then, we provided a
detailed explanation of the ASILs allocation problem,
including the fitness function and the solution quality
measurements. Next, we reviewed different methods ded-
icated to allocate ASILs by categorizing them as exact and
optimization approaches according to their nature. We
provided a detailed explanation for the resolution
methodology of each approach, followed by a review that
contains the strengths and weaknesses of each technique.
Finally, we discussed the remaining challenges in the
ASILs allocation problem. In the future, we plan to extend
the review by including the safety requirement allocation in
other areas such as Development Assurance Levels (DALs)
in the aerospace industry.
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